Commentary - Part 2

I could proceed to speculate on what the author means by use of the term “traditional” by including here the definition that was offered in “the letter” that was mailed to the membership of Morningview back in September. There would be no shortage of errors I could point out in that definition, but rather than do that, I want to engage my readers on a much more basic level. The original letter that was mailed to Morningview members back in September and most of the rhetoric generated by that group (this latest “Advertiser letter” included) reveals what I think is a basic problem in rational thought or reasoning, and I think it has mainly to do with the presuppositions upon which the reasoning construct is built, and it is this observation which I will discuss.

If you are a Christian, it should be evident to you that the world around you does not begin with a system of reason founded upon the doctrine of God. The world does not see the Bible as the final authority on all things. Certainly there are variants and extremes in the field of philosophy, but all of philosophy can be segregated into two distinct and antagonistic schools – there are ultimately only two types of philosophy: one begins with God and the other begins with man. The Christian should see this basic antithesis clearly. Consider the fact that since the earliest days there has only been two counsels. There is the counsel of God, and the counsel of the creature. Now, to the unregenerate man, these things are foolishness (1 Corinthians 1:18-25). We should not be surprised that the unregenerate man thinks the way that he does. What is surprising, though, is when Christians integrate worldly reasoning constructs into their systems. This is tantamount to embracing that which is evil as good! This is the innate problem with so much of evangelicalism today – the supplanting of the wisdom of God with the “wisdom” of this age; hence, the relativism and subjectivity so prevalent in so-called Christianity today. It is treacherous ground that we stand upon when we do not see clearly the sharpness of the contrast in presuppositions upon which systems of thought are built. That's all I have time for now, but more to come on the implications of what I have said here...